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In his Millennium Report to the UN General Assembly, Secretary-General Kofi Annan
challenged the international community to address the real dilemmas posed by intervention
and sovereignty. The independent International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) was established by the Canadian government in September 2000 to
respond to that challenge. After a year of intense worldwide consultations and debate, the
Commission presented its Report, The Responsibility to Protect (hereafter the Report). With
its central theme of the "responsibility to protect," the Report underlined the primary
responsibility of sovereign states to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—
from mass murder, from large-scale loss of life and rape, from starvation. But when they
are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader
community of states—there must be no more Rwandas or Srebrenicas.
While there is general agreement internationally that we should not stand by in the face of
massive violations of human rights, respect for the sovereign rights of states retains a
central place among the ordering principles of the international community. The third annual
seminar co-sponsored by Pugwash Canada and Science for Peace focused on the
recommendations, themes, and implications of the Report and its supplementary volume
(containing background research and a bibliography). It was attended by 46 people. Prior to
the seminar at the University of Toronto on March 23, 2002, The Responsibility to Protect
was made available to all the members of Science for Peace and Pugwash Canada through
the Internet and some hard copies and CDs were distributed during the meeting.
The chairman of the meeting and the Canadian Pugwash Group, Senator Douglas Roche
began the seminar by congratulating the Canadian government, particularly the former
Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy for initiating the work of the ICISS, and his
successor Foreign Minister Bill Graham for strongly supporting its recommendations. He
reminded the members of Pugwash and Science for Peace in attendance (hereafter the
Group) that, whereas most of the work of the ICISS had been completed before September
11, the findings and recommendations of the Commission continued to remain very relevant
in our interdependent world. Senator Roche counselled the audience members to take a
wide view in today’s discussion and concern themselves not just with countering terrorism
but with human protection, human security, and the measures Canada could take to
implement its responsibility to protect.
The first guest speaker, Ms. Gisèle Côté-Harper, was introduced by the chair as Canada’s
Commissioner on the ICISS, a recipient of the Lester B. Pearson medal, and an Officer of
the Order of Canada. A barrister and professor of Law at Laval University, she was also the
former Chair of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development
and a Member of the UN Human Rights Commission. In her thirty-minute presentation, Ms.
Côté-Harper highlighted general and specific sections and objectives of the Report;
addressed conceptual issues underlying the debate that has since ensued; and considered
other initiatives and responsibilities that could be undertaken by individuals, states, and the
international community. She also explained that since the main body of the report was

written before the attack on Washington and New York, the Commissioners held a special
meeting to take note of the extent to which September 11 had changed international
society. Accordingly, she drew the Group’s attention to the Forward of the Report (which
explains that the Report was not written to guide states when faced with attacks on their
own nationals) and Article 51 of the UN Charter, acknowledging the inherent right of selfdefence, and chapter 7, authorizing the use of force to maintain security.
In her wide-ranging overview of many of the Report’s sections and objectives, Ms. CôtéHarper explained that the Commissioners had succeeded, in her view, in producing a guide
of action that was realistic, intellectually credible and satisfying, as well as unlikely to be
rejected out-of-hand by the North, South, the UN Security Council, or other international
constituencies. Due to the need to instigate widespread international support, as well as a
consensus among twelve Commissioners, she pointed out that the Report can be criticized
for not being sufficiently ambitious, however it is a good starting point on which to build
incrementally. A measure of the Report’s success is that UN Secretary-General Annan now
speaks of a country’s responsibility to protect, not of a country’s duty to intervene.
In her treatment of many of the conceptual issues underlying the debate that ensued over
the Report, the Commissioner drew attention to the idea that the principle of state
sovereignty is sacrosanct but no longer absolute. For instance, 52 states have already
ratified the Statute of Rome, which recognizes that crimes against humanity should be
prosecuted through a Permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), and she suggested that
it might soon be possible to establish the ICC, once 60 nations had signed and 18 judges
were obtained. She also underlined the fact that most of the armed conflicts we face in the
world today are intra-, not inter-state conflicts (e.g. of 56 armed conflicts in 2000, 53 were
internal). This phenomenon was not likely to disappear, making it all the more important
that the international community address how and with what measures it would address, for
example, internal conflicts in the sub-continent of Africa ranging from Somalia to Sierra
Leone to Madagascar to Zimbabwe. While there are many international instruments (such as
the UN Covenant on International Rights) and regional treaties committing states to protect
their citizens (e.g. through the OAU, the OAS, and the Council of Europe), the ICISS sought
to emphasize the concept of a ‘responsibility continuum’ whereby states and the
international community would recognise the importance of preventing, reacting, and
rebuilding. The new diplomacy would need to address the immediate and root causes of
international conflict, as well as the responsibility to rebuild, so that further conflict did not
take place. In particular, she drew the Group’s attention to the Report’s Synopsis,
particularly the most critical and difficult-to-address circumstances dealt with under (1) The
Just Cause Threshold and (3) Right Authority.
In her concluding comments and subsequent reply to questions from the audience, Ms.
Côté-Harper also put forward specific recommendations that:
critics in the media and academe recognize that the report, by its very nature, had to put
forward incremental steps which would be accepted by all; indeed, a measure of the
Report’s success is that it does not reflect the preferred views of any one of the twelve
Commissioners, all of whom brought different views to the table; moreover, the UN Security
Council has agreed to discuss the Report at its retreat on September 11, 2002;
different groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) within civil society, as well as
many regional, and sub-regional actors take it upon themselves to feel more responsible
about ‘reacting’ and readily involving themselves as part of their responsibility to protect;
Pugwash Canada and Science for Peace strike an informal or formalized committee to report
to Minister Bill Graham with proposals to involve the members of these organizations and

other similar NGOs in the important task of building international consensus to support the
Report’s main recommendations.
Ms. Côté-Harper’s presentation was followed by two presentations from Dr. H. Peter Langille
and Dr. Walter Dorn, as well as an extended group discussion before and after a luncheon.
Dr. Langille was invited to comment upon the Report, particularly on the ‘next steps’ for
ensuring protection, as well as the prevention, of armed conflict. Dr. Langille has an MA in
Conflict Analysis from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton
University and a PhD in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford in the United
Kingdom. He initiated the development of a multinational peacekeeping training centre in
Canada, now the Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre, and he was on the Core
Working Group of the Canadian government’s study, Towards A United Nations Rapid
Reaction Capability. Having just completed his third book manuscript, Bridging the
Commitment-Capacity Gap: Existing Arrangements and Emerging Options for Enhancing UN
Rapid Deployment for the Centre for UN Reform in the US, the chair suggested that Dr.
Langille’s comments would be particularly apt given the seminar’s focus on not just why—
but how—the international community might intervene in deadly conflict.
Dr. Langille drew the audience’s attention to some contentious issues that the ICISS had to
grapple with, particularly those surrounding respect for human rights as well as national
sovereignty. He praised the Report for innovatively reframing the debate, successfully
finding common ground between different constituencies within civil society and
government, and providing useful new ideas such as the responsibility continuum. Dr.
Langille went on to provide some constructive criticism and a few specific recommendations.
In particular, he questioned whether the Commission’s criteria of last resort, which stated
that "prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated"
were overly restrictive, ‘set the bar too high’, and could result in situations where it would
simply be too late to help, due in part to problems with national decision- making,
preparation, and training, which should commence early. By the Commission’s own
reckoning, he pointed out, the crises in Kosovo or Haiti might not have been addressed, and
future crises might result in governments deliberately choosing to wait and watch, rather
than intervene.
Dr. Langille went on to recommend further attention be paid to the ‘how’ of prevention and
humanitarian protection—with what instruments might the international community
effectively intervene? He saw greater potential and legitimacy in working to develop more
rapid, reliable and effective UN capabilities, rather than focusing upon ad hoc regional
alliances and coalitions of the willing. There was simply no evidence of the latter intervening
in the initial stages of a humanitarian crisis when there was a serious risk that they would
sustain casualties. Moreover, there were promising and supportive trends evident in UN
peace operations, including the implementation of the ‘Brahimi’ recommendations, the
potential of the SHIRBRIG, and the emphasis since 1997 on more robust operations,
including Chapter VII mandates for the limited use of force and provisions for protecting
civilians. Dr. Langille also noted the renewed interest in improving UN rapid deployment
capabilities in the February session of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations, as well as the growing constituency supporting U.S. House of Representatives
Bill 938 for a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force (PSF), an initiative
similar to the earlier Canadian proposal for a UN Standing Emergency Group.
Dr. Langille went on to suggest that there might soon be wider receptivity to the general
themes within the Report. While the ongoing war on terrorism appeared to be prompting a
clash of paradigms, it was also revitalizing interest in multilateral cooperation and a
legitimate counterweight to unilateralism, particularly given the prospect of a more divided,

heavily armed, and dangerous world. Dr. Langille held forth hope that there might be a
return to the UN in the days ahead as after every war of the past century, there has been a
temporal effort to empower international organizatio ns. Finally, the speaker commented on
several potentially supportive trends in defence planning, citing the emphasis on long-range
force projection with offensive rapid reaction strike forces. While problematic, these might
yet be re-directed to assist with prevention and protection, but it would be up to civil society
to generate more comprehensive and inclusive initiatives to shift priorities and mobilize
political will.
Dr. Walter Dorn was then introduced as Secretary of the Canadian Pugwash Group and a
Research Professor with the Department of Politics and Economics, Royal Military College, as
well as a faculty member of the Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre. A scientist by
training (PhD Chemistry, University of Toronto), he assisted with the negotiation,
ratification, and implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). His interests
are now broader, covering both international and human security, especially peacekeeping
and the UN. For instance, he has extensive experience in field missions in East Timor,
Ethiopia, and at UN headquarters with the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations. A
former Senior Research Fellow at Cornell University, consultant to Yale University, and
adviser to the Federation of American Scientists, most recently he was a Human Security
Fellow in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Human Security
Fellowship program.
Dr. Dorn complimented the Commissioners for producing a visionary yet realistic report with
many workable recommendations. He a
l uded the Canadian government for initiating the
entire process and drawing together so many capable experts to bring international
attention to this important topic through such a high-level international forum. Despite the
provocative nature of the concepts of intervention and sovereignty (‘red flag words’ to
some), the inevitable difficulties of forging consensus, and the great challenge of developing
workable criteria, the Commissioners had come up with an important and useful
contribution to the advancement of international policy. He commented, however, that the
suggested criteria for intervention were basically the same as those developed by Saint
Augustine in his Just War theory in the 400s. The task now was to refine the interpretations
for modern times, something the report did poorly. He criticized the Report for not testing
its intervention criteria on recent intervention/enforcement cases in an empirical, if not
scientific, fashion. Like Dr. Langille, Dr. Dorn argued that the international community
should not wait for too long to intervene but should take a more pro-active stance, with
better early warning and response mechanisms. For example, he would have liked the
Commission to recommend that the UN be given a stronger mandate to monitor trouble
spots through a ‘UN Open Skies’ system (as was originally proposed by President
Eisenhower in 1961), as well as more power to investigate sanctions, monitor elections, and
investigate human rights abuses on-site. The Report might have also noted the need for
impartial monitoring of enforcement actions (such as those undertaken by ‘coalitions of the
willing’ in the Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghanistan) to verify that these actions are taken in
accordance with international humanitarian law and the specific guidelines of the UN. The
report might also have recommended ways to render the UN Security Council’s deliberations
more transparent.
Returning to Ms. Côté-Harper’s comments on Article 51 of the UN Charter, Walter Dorn
noted that the inherent right to self-defence is not unlimited. It is greatly qualified in the
Charter. The right is no longer applicable once the Security Council has taken action to
maintain international peace and security. It cannot be used as a reason to exact
punishment, only for immediate response to stop the aggression which was in progress. Nor
can it be used as an excuse to intervene when the UN Security Council does not approve.

Dr. Dorn went on to suggest that the Report's criteria could be subject to conflicting
interpretations simply because so many areas were open to interpretation in a restrictive
fashion (e.g., what constitutes domestic jurisdiction). Finally, Dr. Dorn pointed to some
measure of hypocrisy or a ‘double standard’ in that the international community seems
willing to countenance US-led coalitions of the willing in "rough-shod Sylvester Stallone
campaigns" but seldom questions their legitimacy or inherent discrimination. He asked why
the international community cannot demand the same standard of protection and concern
for innocent civilians on the ground as is given to the soldiers of the nations carrying out the
bombing/enforcement actions (e.g., zero casualty tolerance). The speaker concluded his
talk by pointing out that just as the IICSS had put forward excellent ideas for international
perusal, groups like Pugwash Canada and Science for Peace could contribute useful ideas to
the Canadian government and the UN that might advance human security, peace
enforcement and peacekeeping.
During the Group’s extensive discussion, a wide variety of questions and comments were
raised. For the sake of clarity, these have been grouped here into five major themes and
five general recommendations.
MAJOR THEMES
1. The Problem of ‘Inconsistent Interventions’
One of the principal themes brought forward during the discussion concerned the
inconsistencies of intervention, or what some referred to as the danger of ‘double
standards’. Many members agreed that while the Commission had accomplished a great
deal in terms of defining current grounds for intervention, the possibility existed that major
powers, such as the US, Russia, or China, could bias decision- making either in favour of, or
against, intervention. Furthermore, problems could arise if members of the international
community chose to intervene in some violent conflicts while ignoring others. In particular,
some speakers cautioned Canadians to refrain from making benign assumptions about US
intentions, particularly given its history of involvement (including with rebel and terrorist
groups) in Latin America, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan. Even-handedness and fair
mindedness would be important characteristics in future decision- making but history was a
witness to the fact that intervention has frequently been inconsistent and unfair.
2. The Importance of Understanding and Tackling the Root Causes of Conflict
Many emphasized that the Commission’s work was very important, however broader
attention needed to be paid to understanding and preventing the root causes and sources of
conflic t. Among the many contributing factors to mass violence that were cited were the
sale of armaments to conflict-prone areas, conflict over lucrative resources such as
diamonds, and lack of civil administration leading to internal chaos. Participants noted as
well subtle causal relationships between biased mediators, weakly-formulated peace
proposals, Great Power strategic calculations, and dangerous ultimatums. Members agreed
that the subjective and politicized nature of the debate was such that there might not be
complete agreement on the causes of violence—but it was, nevertheless, important to widen
the parameters of analysis to include a host of possible contributing factors.
3. The Role of Armed versus Unarmed Forces in Intervention
There was considerable debate about the morality and efficacy of employing armed
conventional forces in order to ameliorate violent conflict. Some members of the Group
argued strongly that the use of force could not be justified under any circumstances, while

others maintained that combat-capable forces are necessary, just as armed police officers
are necessary in domestic jurisdictions to credibly quell conflict. While some argued that
members of the international community should aim to forge peace by emulating the nonviolent actions of NGOs such as Peace Brigades International, others pointed out that
belligerents may not be deterred from slaughtering each other and innocent civilians unless
they are faced with the threat of the use of force. Whether the international community
would be itself irresponsible by sending unarmed forces into areas of deadly conflict or
genocide was also considered, and general agreement seemed to coalesce in favour of the
idea of strengthening the UN’s rapid reaction capabilities to prevent deadly conflict or
genocide from taking place in the first place.
4. The Importance of Mandating and Equipping the UN to Intervene
Members agreed that while there is an increased tendency within the international arena to
rely on regional alliances, such as NATO and the OSCE, and on coalitions of the willing to
intervene, in the long run it would be important to assign the UN more powers and
capabilities to intervene. In particular, the Canadian government’s seeming willingness to
condone US-dominated coalitions of the willing, even US unilateralism, was criticized, while
many speakers advocated preserving a system of UN-led, multilateral intervention that
reflected international law. In terms of concrete proposals to equip the UN to intervene, the
discussion returned to the merits and demerits of relying upon stand-by versus standing
volunteer UN forces and the necessity of equipping the UN to intervene, for instance by
improving its access to strategic air lift capacities.
5. The Importance of Discerning the Underlying Reasons for Intervention
In its discussion, Group members spent considerable time discussing ‘just war’ principles
and whether any war can be considered to be just. It was argued that narrow nationalism,
militarism, self-interest, or ‘evil’ actually underlay many arguments in favour of undertaking
a just war. Accordingly, it should be understood that great powers would intervene only if it
was in their own self-interest. In the international climate spawned by September 11, some
criticized the Canadian government for naively overlooking the United States’ intention to
preserve its own interests, and encouraged government representatives to take a stronger
stand internationally to oppose American unilateralism which violated international law
principles. Indeed, there was general unease about the unilateralism of the US and the
heedless manner in which it seems to be dama ging or discarding agreements and regimes
of great import and meaning to others.
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
In discussing future roles for the Canadian government, Pugwash Canada and Science for
Peace, many specific recommendations were put forward by individuals though these were
not placed before the Group for endorsement as a whole. These can be broadly grouped into
five recommendations to:
•

explore modes of international cooperation to respond earlier, including
institutionalizing diagnostic forces that could be deployed at the earliest sign of
international concern and which would report back to the UN;

•

encourage more in-depth analysis of alternatives to armed intervention such as nonarmed UN international monitoring forces, stricter enforcement of international law,
increased dialogue amongst belligerents, the bringing to trial through the ICC of

world leaders who have violated international law, and further regulation and
transparency within the world’s secret services;
•

ensure a more important role for our elected representatives, particularly Members
of Parliament and parliamentary committees, in deciding whether to deploy troops to
intervene and/or to engage in armed conflict and war;

•

support a more equitable and improved division of labour between the US and its
allies by encouraging the Canadian government to specialize in multilateral peace
support operations, UN rapid deployment, and peacebuilding (even as the US
continues to pursue high-technology warfighting, long-range power projection,
increased air power, and the dangerous weaponization of space);

•

plan to establish, in the long-run, a voluntary UN force consisting of trained military,
civilian, and police forces that would build upon the UN’s current system of stand-by
national units (SHIRBRIG) and the Canadian government’s original proposal to
establish a UN rapid reaction capability.

Finally, there was general sentiment in the Group in favour of Ms. Côté-Harper’s suggestion
that Pugwash Canada and Science for Peace strike an informal or formalized committee to
report back to Minister Bill Graham with proposals to involve the members of these
organizations and other similar NGOs in the important task of building international
consensus to support the Report’s main recommendations. The chair Douglas Roche
affirmed that combining the strengths of Pugwash and Science for Peace in such a
committee could enrich new ways of thinking and accord these groups a significant
opportunity to influence the government’s agenda.
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